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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of lhe
STATE 01' 1JTAH
JAMES P. KNUCKLES
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO.
12254

BRIEF OF APPELLANT - RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff seeks indemnity for loss of sight of an eye under
a "Group Insurance Certificate" issued by Appellant to employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur Company, Incorporated.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Lower Court held in favor of Plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmation of Lower Court's decision.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent agrees generally with the Statement
of Facts presented by Defendant-Appellant.
Plaintiff-Respondent does not agree with Defendant-Appellant's statement that "Plaintiff's injured eye is physiologically normal except for the loss of the crystalline lens and
a slight scar on the cornea" and will direct his Statement of
Facts primarily to this point.
Plaintiff-Respondent, while working for Texas Gulf Sulphur Company as an underground miner with normal vision
without the use of lenses of any kind (Tr., page 12-15) participated in a group life and accident policy purchased by
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company employees from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Plaintiff's coverage commenced
June 12, 1965, and was in effect February 23, 1967, (Tr. page
7 and Items 1 and 2 of Pre-Trial Order) when the accident
causing the loss of the sight of his right eye, took place. The
policy provided, among other things, for the payment to Plaintiff-Respondent of $7500.00 in the event he suffered the "total
and irrecoverable loss of the sight of one eye." (Policy attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as "Exhibit A".) As the direct
and proximate cause of the injury (Depo. Dr. Robert W. Rigg,
lines 4, 5, 6, page 20) and in an effort to restore his vision,
Plaintiff-Respondent submitted to five surgical procedures,
three to remove the crystalline lens (Dep. James P. Rigg, pages
4, 18 and 24) and two to correct muscular imbalance caused
by the injury. ( Dep. Robert W. Rigg, page 8.)

"Q. So, would you then describe the abnormalties that
now exist in the eye ?

"A. The abnormalties are from the standpoint of visual
acuity. He has approximately 20/800 visual acuity in this eye.
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"Q. But physiologically, what is now abnoral, just for
my information?
"A. Physiologically, this is an abnormalty ." ( Depo. James
Rigg, Sr., page 25, lines 12 through 18, as amended.)
July 22, 1968
Mr. Blair Kinnersley
Claim Adjuster
State Insurance Fund
215 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

James Paul Knuckles
File No. 67-2827 (2)
Inj: 2-23-67

My dear Mr. Kinnersley:

It is with deep regret that I did not identify the fact that Mr.
Knuckles is totally blind in the right eye only. He has adequate
vision in the left eye - 20/20. The only eye involved in compensation is the right.
May I graciously thank you for your letter.
Most sincerely,
s: James P. Rigg, Sr. M.D.
JPR:gf

"

(Letter marked Exhibit 2 and identified in the Deposition of
James P. Rigg. See Rigg's deposition at page 29).

"Q. Now, would you have an opinion as to whether or
not a person has lost his eyesight irrevocably because of a cataract operation ?
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"A. No, you can't say that it's been lost to that extent
except if they cannot wear a contact lens or they cannot wear'
a forward lens. Then, it is essentially lost. It's never going to
be as good as what the good Lord gave you. Nobody would
deny that." (De po. Robert W. Rigg, page 16, lines 7 through

14.)

"A. It's been reported that the average age of a cataract,
an eye that has had a cataract removed, is about ten years.
They are more prone to have retinal detachment and other
conditions of their eyes than the average eye, than a normal
eye, I should say." Depa. Robert W. Rigg, page 19, lines
19 through 23.)

"A. Only two things: he was injured in the eye, he had
a blow in the eye, and he's had a cataract develop in the eye.
It's an abnormal condition from the first and one which may
have other problems. This is a known fact by all ophthalmologists and it will be verified by anybody, I'm sure." ( Depo.
Robert W. Rigg, page 21, lines 13 through 17.)

"Q. Would you have an opinion whether or not the loss
of his eye without correction is irrecoverable?
"A. Oh, for certain.

"Q. I mean, is there anything -

what I'm trying to get
at doctor, is there anything more that surgery or medication
could do that would result in that eye perceiving things more
clearly?
"A. No, there's nothing. There is no other means except
artificial unless you wait for the resurrection." ( Dep. Dr. Robert W. Rigg, page 17, lines 1-10.) ( Dep. Dr. Merrill, page
7, lines 13 through 15 and page 20, lines 7 through 11.)
"Well, the opinion without a lens is about five four-hun-
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dreths, or it's almost useless vision." ( Depo. Dr. Merrill, page
5, line 21.)
When not wearing a contact lens the Plaintiff-Respondent
has, for all practical purposes, lost the sight of his ~ight eye.
Using the injured eye without a contact lens (Depo. Dr. Merrill, page 20, lines 7 through 11, vage 22, lines 1 through 7)
he could not drive a car, watch television, see a football game,
fish, sight a gun, or take care of his many needs. (Depo. James
P. Rigg, pages 1, 4 and 35.) ( Depo. Robert W. Rigg, page
18.) ( Depo. Dr. Merrill, page 6, lines 6 through 15.)
"A. Uncomfortable to wear, but there again some people
are more motivated than other people. Some people can't
wear a contact lens, in normal condition, whereas other people can wear them in practically any kind of condition."
( Dcpo. Dr. Merill, page 10, lines 20 through 23.) Plaintiff's
vision is substantially improved and by medical standards
can be corrected to 20/20 minus 3 visual acquity when wearing contact and forward lenses. Medical testimony substantiates the fact that not all people can wear contact lens. ( Depo.
Robert W. Rigg, page 16, lines 21, 22.) (Tr. Dr. Ronald H.
Merrill, page 37, lines 14-20.) Plaintiff testified he _has been
unable to wear the contact lens prescribed for him because of
irritation to the eye. (Tr. pages 15, 16) although the lens had
been re-worked to make it more comfortable. (Depo. Robert
W. Rigg, page 9, lines 14, 15.)
See Findings of Fact prepared by Trial Court.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
The Plaintiff-Respondent did suffer the "total and irre-
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coberable loss of the sight" of his right eye within the mean.
ing of the policy and the applicable laws.
45 C.

J.

S., Paragraph 900, page 986:

"c. Loss of Sight
"Provisions in accident policies for the payment of specified indemnity for loss of sight are liberally construed
in favor of the insured, and within such provisions there
is an entire loss of sight, although sight is not completely
destroyed, if what sight is left is of no practical use or
benefit.
''The term "irrecoverable and entire loss of sight" as useJ
in accident insurance policies providing for specified indemnity therefore should be liberally construed in favor
of insured, and the construction to be placed on this
term is not aff ectecl by the fact that the policy also provides for weekly indemnity payments for other accidental
injuries not otherwise specifically enumerated. So a provision for indemnity for loss of sight is not qualified by a
separate provision in the policy for indemnity in case of
total disability. Although sight is not completely destroyed, there is a "loss of entire sight" or an "entire loss of
sight" within an accident policy if what sight is left is of
no practical use or benefit. Practical use does not mean
use in a particular calling or occupation, but rather that
use which will render practical service with respect to
many needs and pleasures, and the mere fact that insur·
ed could not advantageously use his eye in his work or
in reading is not sufficient to entitle him to recover for
entire loss of sight. Inability to use both eyes simultan·
eously constitutes loss of the practical use of one eye.
Whether there is a loss of the practical use of an eye
when peripheral vision exists depends on the facts of
each individual case.**"
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44 Am Jur 2d s 1604, page 494:
"s 1604. Loss of eyes or eyesight.
"Under policies merely insuring against loss of sight, there
is no necessity that the eye be so physically damaged
that it must be removed, although a policy may expressly
require the physical removal of the eye. However, where
the insured has sustained a loss of sight or of useful sight,
the courts are not in agreeme'nt as to whether the insured
has lost his sight within the meaning of the policy where
his vision can be restored by a surgical operation or by
the use of glasses, or where the insured has retained or
regained usable vision in his injured eye, although he has
suffered a loss of binocular vision so that he can use one
eye or the other but cannot use them both together."
78 A. L. R. 2d 488:
"Loss of useful sight as test. Whether the policy insures
against loss of sight, loss of entire sight, or entire loss of
sight, or whether it refers to blindness or total blindness,
it is generally interpreted to mean loss of practical use
of sight rather than literal blindness."
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah is committed
to the reasonable and responsible interpretation of "loss of
sight" and has repeatedly declared that a contract of insurance will be construed in such a way as to give practical effect to its terms and conditions.
MAYNARD v. LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS MUTUAL
LIFE AND ACCIDENT INS. ASSN.
Supreme Court of Utah, November 4, 1897
16 Utah 145; 51 P 259

In holding that total and permanent loss of the sight of
one eye entitles insured to recover for the "total and permanent loss of eyesight" where such injury disables him from
pursuing his usual and accustomed occupation, the Court said :
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"**The terms of the by-law in question must be interpreted liberally and reasonably, and as they appear to be
susceptible of two constructions, that must be adopted
which will more nearly carry out the benign object of
the association, and sustain the claim of the injured. The
provisions will not be scrutinized for the purpose of enabling the organization to escape liability to any of its
members, or for the purpose of creating limitations, in
favor of the association, which do not satisfactorily appear within the terms of the by-law. Where associations
or corporations are organized for the purpose of mutual
benefit and relief, their by-laws will not be so interpreted as to favor the forfeiture of the rights of its members or those dependent upon them. The by-laws of mutual benefit societies should be construed liberally, <:ia<l
with a view to effectuate the benevolent purposes of their
organization. When there is any ambiguity or inconsistency in .the terms of such by-laws, that construction
should be given to them which is most favorable to the
rights of the members. Nibl. Ben. Soc & Acc. Ins. ss 17,
143; Bae. Ben Soc. s 86; Insurance Co. v. ~,fond, 102 Pa,
St. 89; Burkhard v. Insurance Co., Id 262; Humphreys
v. Association, 139 Pa. St. 264 ; 20 Atl. 104 7 ; Hoff m8n
v. Insurance Co. 32 N. Y. 405."
CLARK v. STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF DETROIT
District Court of Appeals, Second District Division 1, Calif.
(1941)

43 C. A. 563; 111 P 2d 354.
The appellate court found that the trial court's finding
of fact that the Plaintiff lost entire sight of the right eye was
not supported by the evidence and remanded the case for new
trial. In doing so the court stated:
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"It is true that it has been held that the terms irrecoverable and "entire loss of sight" as used· in insurance policies should be liberally construed in favor of the insured
and that a person need not therefore be totally blind to
recover indemnity for an irrecoverable and entire loss ot
sight. Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Terrill, 4 Cir. 29
Fd 460; Locomotive Engineers' Mut. Life & Acc. Ins.
Co. v. Meeks, 157 Miss 97; 127 South 699, 702; International Travelers Ass'n v. Rogers, Tex Clv. App. 163,
S. W. 421; Tracey v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 119
Me 131, 109 Atl 490, 9 A. L. R. 521, and other numerous decisions many of which haYe been cited by appellant.

"Under the liberal construction of the terms of a p:--licy
providing indemnity for irrecoverable and entire loss of
sight, as above noted, the determination of loss of sight
is based upon the practical use to which the injured ey<'
may be put. See International Travelers Ass'n. v. Rogers
supra; Pan American Life Ins. Co. v. Terrill, supra;
Murray v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., D. C. 243, F 285.
Practical use does not necessarily mean use in a particular calling or occupation, but rather that use which will
render practical service in respect to many needs and
pleasures. See Murray v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. supra. While
there is some authority holding that practical use is not
the test, such decifions appear to be based on a literal
construction of the term "entire loss of sight" hence under a liberal interpretation, the loss of practical use of
the eye appears to be the equivalent of the loss of the
"entire" sight of the eye, as that term is used in the policy of insurance here in question. The fact that a policy
provides for disabilities in addition to those specifically
enumerated should not, as argued by appellant, alter the
construction to be placed on the provision for loss of
sight."
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CLARK v. STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO.
OF DETROIT
43 C. A. 2d 563 ; 112 P 2d 298
This case denied rehearing of 111 P 2d 354 supra. In denying rehearing the Court said:
"The plea.dings herein presented two qur"<;tions for the
trial. First: Had appellant actually lost tl1e entir~ si!!l1t
of the eye, and second: If appellant had not actually lost
the entire sight of the eye, had the vision been so greatly
impared as to destroy the practkal use of the eye.
"It may be well to state here, also, that in view of the
undisputed evidence of the existence of peripheral yision in the injured eye, whether practical use of the eye
h<l:S been lost presents a very close question. See Powers
v. Motor Wheel Corporation, 252 Mi.ch 639; 234 N. W.
122; 73 A. L. R. 702. However, where questions of this
nature arise, their determination depends so much upon
the facts of each individual case that it would create a
dangerous and undoubtedly harsh precedent to establish,
as a rule of law, that the existence of peripheral vision in
every case constituted existence of practical use of eyesight."

JAMES DWIGHT TRACEY v. STANDARD ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY
119 Me. 131; 109 Atl. 490; 9 A. L. R. 521
This case, among other things, revolved on the following question :
"5. Did he lose the entire sight of his eye? **The phrase
"loss of entire sight" should be so construed as to give
the Plaintiff what he bought and paid for, and not to
defeat the whole purpose and intent of this contract. It
should be held to mean that the entire loss of the use of
the eye from blindness is a loss of the entire sight of that
10
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eye. But if technicalities were to be invoked, then the
meaning of the word "sight" becomes as important as
the meaning of the word "entire." "Sight" is defined in
Wester's Standard Dictionary: 1. The power of seeing
the faculty of vision or perceiving objects. 2. Act of seeing; perception of objects by the instrumentality of the
eyes; view. "To see" is defined: to perceive with the eye;
to have knowledge of the existence and apparent qualities of by the organs of sight; to examine with the eyes;
to behold; descry; view; observe; inspect."

POINT II
The fact that the Plaintiff's blindness can be temporarily
corrected during the times that the artifical means are in actual use does not restore the "total and irrecoverable loss of
sight" of his right eye, nor does it alter the terms of his insurance contract providing for payment of the loss of sight which
he has sustained.
WESTERN CONTRACTING CORPORATION, et al v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, et al.
Supreme Court of Utah 1964
15 Utah 2d 208; 390 P 2d 125
"Original proceeding for review of an award of the Industrial Commission. The Supreme Court, Wade J., held
that Industrial Commission's award of statutory 100
weeks' compensation for total blindness of one eye, a substantial function of which was restored by the use of
optical lens, could not be held capricious, arbitrary, or
unreasonable and it would be affirmed."
The Court stated : Many of the losses separately scheduled in this statute are much more similar than these,
and the legislature, had it so intended could easily have

11
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scheduled two different losses, one for total blindness of
one eye and one for such total blindness which coulJ be
substantially restored by an artifical lens."
GOODYEAR SERVICE STORE, et al vs. INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, et al.
Supreme Court of Utah, July 31, 1968
21 Utah 2d 249; 444 P 2d 119

In this case the claimant had suffered an eye injury that
resulted in the loss of vision of his eye uncorrected.
"Dr. Smith reported to the Commission on July 18, 1966,
that the operation had been performed with good result.
He stated that with the use of glasses Mr. Dowdle had
satisfactory vision in all fields of gaze, but that without
them double vision continued with the same deficiency
he had stated before, to-wit: But without his glasses he
has visual efficiency loss of one eye. Without his glasses,
this would then represent a 25 percent loss of binocular
visual efficiency, with 100 percent visual efficiency loss
of one eye."
The Court, in holding that the injured party was entitled to receive full compensation for the loss of the sight of
his one eye, stated as follows:
" ( 1) Whether a 100 percent loss of the visual efficiency
of one eye is due to the inability of the lens of that eye
to further function, or is the result of an injury to the
muscles of the eye that provide motility, thus resulting
in loss of vision by diplopia, the result appears to be the
same - the patient has a loss of total vision equivalent
· l eff.1ciency
·
to 100 percent loss o f v1sua
of one eye. ***"
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McCULLOUGH v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE CO.
Supreme Court of Kansas 1942
155 Kan 629; 127 P 2d 467
This is an industrial case where the Plaintiff lost the
sight of his eyes which vision could be substantially restored
by artifical appliances. The Court said:
"We have no case in our state suggesting that compensation for the loss of a leg, for the arm, hand, or other
member of thebody, where such compensation is provided by the schedule, should be decreased by the use of
an artifical limb, or that a partial loss of such a member should decrease the compensation because of braces
or other artifical appliances. We are cited no case from
other jurisdictions so holding, and our own research has
disclosed none. **A further reason, if one be needed, is
that the use of glasses would not restore the lens of the
eye lost by the in jury Plaintiff received in this case - the
physical in jury is not cured by the use of glasser as a
hernia would be cured by a successful operation."
OTOE FOOD PRODUCTS CO. v. GRUISKHANK
Supreme Court of Nebraska
141 Neb 298; 3 NW 2d 452
"The Plaintiff received an eye m1ury to his right eye
that left him with peripheral vision and without the aid
glasses and that with glasses the eye could be corrected
to 97 % normal.
"Issue: Whether or not, under the Nebraska Industrial
Act the court should take into consideration in "determining the loss of vision of an eye or eyes, the fact that
vision may be restored or corrected in part or in whole,
by the use of glasses. **We should not, by construction,
put into a law provisions which it does not contain, nor
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read into it a meaning not intended by the legislature
If the act is faulty, the correction should be made by the
legislature and not by the court. We see no more logic
in holding that the legislature intended to ha:-:e disability
in an eye case on the condition of the eye after correction, than in a leg or arm case where compensation should
be awarded on the extent of disability after attachment
of a brace or other appliance. The fact that glasses are
required to restore vision is evidence of the permanency
of the injury and whether artifical means may partially
or even wholly restore sight, it nevertheless cannot obliterate the effect of the accident causing the injury."
POCAHONTAS FUEL CO. v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD
118 W. Va. 565; 191 S E 49
"Subsection ( e) of Sec. 6, Art 4, Chapter 23 of the Cock
provides : ( e) The total loss of one eye, or the total and
irrecoverable loss in the sight thereof shall be considered
a thirty-three percent disabi.lity**. The only question presented on this appeal is whether, under subsection ( e)
the claimant shall be compensated for the loss of vision
with correction by the use of glasses or without such correction. An examination of the authorities would seem
to indicate that a conflict of authority exists among the
courts of the country. 99 A. L. R. 716; 24 A. L. R. 1469;
8 A. L. R. 1330. This conflict of authority is more apparent than real. Many of the cases are founded upon
statutes based upon the theory that compensation was
payable only when the accident led to a loss of earning
power. The West Virginia statute provides for compensation for loss of eye or vision, total or partial, attributable to a permanent injury. Nothing in the statute indicates an intention on the part of the legislature that 1glass-·
es or corrective lens should be considered in determining
the loss of the whole or a fractional part of the vision
of an eye. **The position is amply sustained by authority."

14
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GROF v. NATIONAL STEEL PRODUCTS CO., et al
225 Mo. App. 702; 38 W. 2d 518
"It was well said in the case of Allessandro Petrillo Co.
v. Marioni, 3 W. N. Harr ( 33 Del) 99; A. 164, 165; It
may be true that an artifical instrumentality, such as
glasses or a conective lens may subsequently be used by
virtue of which the loss of vision may be reduced from
80 percent to 10 percent during the time such glasses are
actually in use, but the loss suffered by the injury remains the same and is the compensable basis.
"If 80 percent of the vision of an eye is destroyed in an
acicdent and yet the injured person while actually using
specially prepared glasses can obtain normal sight, can
it be successfully contended that no loss or injury at all
has been sustained? Such a position is indeed difficult
to maintain.

"The very fact that artifical instrumentalities such as
glasses, braces, and artifical limbs are necessary to be
used, is in itself evidence of the permanency of the injury,
but the use of the mechanism itself, although it may allow a mernber to function with entire normality, yet it
cannot obliterate the effect of the accident causing the
injury."
MARYLAND REFINING CO., et al vs. COLBOUGH, et al
110 Okl 238; 238 P 831
"The State Industrial Commission is not required, under
the Workmans Compensation Act, to take into consideratio that the effect of a permanent injury to the eye
might be minimized by artifical means in fixing the
award for such permanent injury."
To the same effect: 168 Okla 96; 31 P 2d 925
McDONALD v. STATE TREASURER, et al
52 Idaho 535; 16 P 2d 988
"It is the contention of appellant that the use of glasses
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cannot be taken into consideration in det":rminincr whether appellant is industrially blind or in determining hi<;
compensation. There is a conflict of authority upon this
question, ;is a rcsdt, in some judisdiction·:, or statu'~!.ry
provisions relat:ng to thP use of artifical zpp~iance;;. We
have no such statute and are of the opinion that the
weight of authority and the better rule in the absence of
statute sustain appellant's contention."
None of the arguments made by the Defendant Appellant hold up under examination.

In Defendant-Appellant's Points I and IV he states that
the instant case involves no factual issues and the Court is
obligated to determine the legal question involved.
Plaintiff Respondent has no quarrel with Defendant Appelant's contention that the Court must decide the le~al question in view of the following facts :

1. A good healthy, young eye was destroyed in an industrial accident while an insurance policy insuring industrial
employees eyes, including the Plaintiff's eye, was in effect
and the premium paid.
2. The Plaintiff's right eye was rendered essentially useless and of no practical value except during times when a
specially prepared contact lens is in actual use.
3. Not all persons can wear a contact lens. (Medical
testimony of all three medical experts whose testimony is in
~vidence.)

4. Plaintiff has testified that he has been unable to wear
his contact lens without pain and irritation.
5. The prognosis for the life of the injured eye is 10 years.
Applying these undisputed facts the Appellate Court
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should have little trouble in affirming the trial court's determination of the single question of law the Defendant Appellant refers to.
Plaintiff-Respondent submits that the reasoning of the
various Supreme Courts in industrial cases is applicable in
non-industrial commission cases, interpreting such words as
"total and irrecoverable loss of sight," "loss of entire sight,"
"entire loss of sight," "total blindness." When a person is insured against loss of sight, he should be compensated for such
loss when an injury res~lts in the practical loss of his sight.
It is spurious to argue that the Plaintiff-Respondent has "recovered" his lost vision because he can see during times that
an an artifical device, he cannot wear without irritation, is
in actual use.
Plaintiff Respondent acknowledges the statement made
by the Defendent Appellant and supported in 44 Am. Jur 2d,
page 44 (supra) that "the courts are not in agreement as to
whether the insured has lost his sight within the meaning of
the policy where his vision can be restored by surgical operation or by the use of glasses." The Utah Supreme Court,
however, appears to be counted among those holding that the
use of artifical lenses is not "restored" vision when contact
lenses give temporary relief only. (Maynard v. Locomotive
Engineers supra) (Western Contracting Corp. v. Industrial
Comm.) (Goodyear Service v. Industrial Comm. supra).
Plaintiff Respondent submits that when insurance companies write group policies for industrial concerns like Texas
Gulf Sulphur Company's mine near Moab, Utah, _that it is
charged with the duty to so word the contract that it will be
clearly understood. That the contract should be interpreted
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so as to carry out the intention of both parties and not merely the intention of the insurance company that wrote the contract. The same rational applies in this case to the Defendant
Appellant as it applied to the legislature in the case of Western Contracting Corporation v. Industrial Commission (supra)
when the Utah Supreme Court said: "The legislature, had
it so intended, could easily have scheduled two different losses,
one for total blindness of one eye and one for such total
blindness which could be substantially restored by an artifical
contact lens." The Kansas court said it well when it stated
that the physical in jury is not cured by the use of glasses as a
hernia would be cured by a successful operation.
The reasoning of the Tennessee case of Benson v. Grand,
Lodge of the Brotherhood of Firemen, et al. 54 SW 132 is
applicable here where the Court stated : "The second assignment of error is not well taken, and is likewise overruled. To
hold that the P.arties have in contemplation the use of lenses
would be to add to the contract a term that is not in it.**"
To paraphrase the Nebraska and Missouri Supreme
Courts, the very fact that the wearing of a contact lens is
essential to make it possible for the Plaintiff Respondent to
have any practical use of his right is the best evidence of the
permanency of the injury, and explanations and legal arguments of the insurance carrier, no matter how ingenious, do
not obliterate the effect of the accident causing the injury.
For Defendant-Appellant to state that "Plaintiff's injured eye
is physiologically normal except for the loss of the crystalline
lens and a slight scar on the cornea" in view of the medical
testimony is equivalent to saying that a leg amputated at the
anklle is physiologically normal except for the loss of the foot
and the injury to the leg. To deny recovery in this case re-
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quires a judicial addition to the contract of msurance never
contemplated.
In conclusion Plaintiff Respondent quotes Justice Wolfe
in the case of Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
94 Utah 532; 72 P 2d 1060, page 1073:
" ( 9) Insurance policies, while in the nature of written
contracts, are not prepared after negotiations between the
parties, to embrace the terms at which the parties have
arrived in their negotiations. They are prepared before
hand by the insurer, and the company solicitors then sell
the insurance idea to the applicant. Normally, the details
and provisions of the policy are not discussed, except that
the particular form of policy is best suited to give the
applicant the protection he seeks. If he reads the policy
he is generally not in a position to understand its details,
terms, and meanin~ except that, in the event against
which he seeks insurance, the company will pay the stipulated sums. He seldom sees the policy until it has been
issued and is delivered to him. He signs an applicant
blank in which the policy sought is described either by
form number or b~r a general designation, pays his premium, anrl in due course thereafter receives, either from
the agent or throug-h the mails, his policy. Many of the
terms and all of its defenses and super-refinements he has
never heard of and would not understand them if he
read them. Such fact is evident from the fact that cases
like this arise where lawers and courts disagree as to what
such provisions mean. In fact, there are about as many
different constructions by the courts of terms such as
those involved here as there are insurance companies issuing such policies. For this reason the rule of strictissimi
juris has been applied almost universally to insurance
contracts, and this jurisdiction, like many others, has declared in favor of a liberal construction in favor of the
insured to accomplish the purpose for which the insurance was taken out and for which the premium was paid.''
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CONCLUSIONS
The judgment rendered by the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectively submitted,
Robert H. Ruggeri
59 East Cenuter Street

P. 0. Box 310, Moab, Utah 84532
Attorney for Plaintiff Respondent
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